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ABSTRACT In a biometric verification system, leakage of biometric data leads to permanent identity
loss since original biometric data is inherently linked to a user. Further, various types of attacks on a
biometric system may reveal the original template and utility in other applications. To address these
security and privacy concerns cancelable biometric has been introduced. Cancelable biometric constructs
a protected template from the original biometric template using transformation functions and performs
the comparison between templates in the transformed domain. Recent approaches towards cancelable
fingerprint generation either rely on aligning minutiae points with respect to singular points (core/delta)
or utilize the absolute coordinate positions of minutiae points. In this paper, we propose a novel non-
invertible ridge feature transformation method to protect the original fingerprint template information.
The proposed method partitions the fingerprint region into a number of sectors with reference to each
minutia point employing a ridge-based co-ordinate system. The nearest neighbor minutiae in each sector
are identified, and ridge-based features are computed. Further, a cancelable template is generated by
applying the Cantor pairing function followed by random projection. We have evaluated our method with
FVC2002, FVC2004 and FVC2006 databases. It is evident from the experimental results that the proposed
method outperforms existing methods in the literature. Moreover, the security analysis demonstrates that
the proposed method fulfills the necessary requirements of non-invertibility, revocability, and diversity
with a minor performance degradation caused due to cancelable transformation.
INDEX TERMS biometric, cancelable biometrics, fingerprint, minutiae, alignment-free, feature extrac-
tion, privacy, security
I. INTRODUCTION
THE compromise of stored biometric template causespermanent identity theft of a user as biometric data
is irreplaceable and irrevocable. There are various types
of attacks and privacy concerns linked with sharing of
biometric information across multiple applications [1], [2].
Jain et al. [3] identified four levels of attacks in a biometric
system. At the first level, the attacker presents a falsified
biometric input to the sensor, and the sensor may not be
able to differentiate between genuine and fake biometric
inputs. Second, the attacker intercepts the communication
link between the different modules to enter into the system.
At the third level, the attacker intercepts the executable
program of a module to get the desired output. Such attacks
are called Trojan-Horse attacks. Last, the attacker replaces/
derives a spoof of the stored template which causes the
security breach. Therefore, biometric template protection is
necessary to address such security challenges. To provide
biometric template protection against the afore-mentioned
attacks, an idea of cancelable biometrics has been presented.
The cancelable biometric scheme applies a transformation
to derive a protected template which is used for verification
instead of the original template of a user. The transformation
relies on a non-invertible function such that it is hard to
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retrieve the original template even if the attacker knows
the transformed template and transformation function. In
a compromise situation, a new protected template can be
derived by altering the parameter values of the transforma-
tion function. The transformation should fulfill the following
requirements described by Breebaart et al. [4]:
1) Non-invertibility: It should be computationally hard to
construct the original template from the transformed
template. This prevents the recovery of the original
biometric information by an imposter.
2) Diversity: Identical cancelable template should not be
used in different applications to avoid cross-matching
of the stored template.
3) Revocability: The transformation should be able to
derive numerous protected templates from the same
biometric input and there should be immediate revo-
cation in case of compromise.
4) Performance: The transformation should not exhibit
significant performance degradation.
Bolle et al. [5] introduced four types of transformations
for cancelable fingerprint template generation which utilize
the core and delta points (singular points) of an input fin-
gerprint. The biohashing based approaches proposed in [6],
[7] combine a user-specific key onto the original biometric
features to derive a protected template. BioHashing and
its variants [6], [7], are proved to be impractical if the
unique seed is compromised. Ahmad et al. [8] proposed
a fingerprint template protection scheme that uses relative
minutiae information in the polar coordinate system as
described in [9]. The proposed scheme underperforms on
the FVC2002 DB3 database where low-quality fingerprint
images exist. The performances of the techniques presented
in [9]–[12] get degraded if the user-specific key or token
is compromised. Further, the limitation of the methods
proposed in [5], [13], [14] lies with the accurate detection
of the singular point (core or reference point). However, it is
not possible to identify the singular points from fingerprint
images of all users. Moreover, accurate detection of core
point from an arch type or a poor quality fingerprint image
is a challenging task.
Farooq et al. [15] derived a binary representation of the
different features computed from all possible triplets which
require a large number of computations. Cappelli et al. [16]
introduced a state-of-the-art Minutiae Cylinder Code (MCC)
based fingerprint representation which outperforms the most
of the existing methods. However, the original MCC ap-
proach does not provide any protection mechanism for
minutiae information. Later, Ferrara et al. [17] proposed the
protected MCC (P-MCC) approach to secure the minutiae
information. Further investigations reveal the irrevocability
issue of P-MCC technique. In order to provide revocability,
Ferrara et al. [18] proposed a two-factor protected Minutiae
Cylinder Code (2P-MCC) scheme which performs curtailed
permutation onto cylinders in P-MCC using a secret key.
Few approaches [14], [19] in literature utilize fixed-radius
transformation. These approaches may cause performance
degradation if the minutiae points are at the edge of the
radius. Owing to noise or local distortion these minutiae
could be considered inside the radius for the first sample
and outside the radius for the second sample for the same
fingerprint. Further, Ahmad et al. [8] and Sutcu et al. [19]
applied a transformation considering a threshold onto the
number of minutiae point to derive the protected template.
Certain methods [11], [12] directly use the position and di-
rection information of minutiae points to derive a protected
fingerprint template. However, selection of invariant features
from the minutiae points results in significant performance
improvement over the original minutiae information. Earlier,
we have proposed a coprime mapping based transformation
to protect the original ridge features. In the prior work [20],
a very less number of brute-force attempts are required
yielding the approach invertible. Moreover, the method
is susceptible to the Attack-via-record-multiplicity (ARM)
attack. Also, the performance degrades in case of FVC2004
where the users are allowed to exaggerate deformations at
the time of acquisition. In this work, we have proposed
random projection based transformation to mitigate the
limitations of our prior work.
In summary, to address the limitations of the existing ap-
proaches depicted above, we propose a novel cancelable fin-
gerprint template generation method based on ridge feature
transformation. Ridge-based features are computed for the
nearest neighbor structure drawn for each reference minutiae
point. Next, the Cantor pairing function is applied to encode
the ridge features, and the logarithm function is used to
uniformly distribute the paired features. Finally, the random
projection is utilized to derive a non-invertible protected
template. In a nutshell, we highlight the contributions of
our work:
1) We have proposed a novel cancelable fingerprint
template design methodology where transformation is
applied over ridge features to cope with rotation, trans-
lation and scale deformations in the input fingerprint
image.
2) The proposed transformation does not lean upon prior
alignment with the singular point which is hard to
discover in the poor quality or missing singular point
fingerprint images.
3) The ridge feature transformation is applied around
each minutia to derive a feature matrix instead of
fixed-radius transformation to overcome the boundary
problems.
4) The Cantor pairing function followed by random pro-
jection is utilized to generate non-invertible cancelable
fingerprint template.
5) The proposed scheme is analyzed with respect to the
necessary criteria of cancelable template generation
i.e. non-invertibility, revocability and diversity. Fur-
ther, the method is also analyzed against different
types of attacks such as Attack via Record Multiplic-
2 VOLUME 4, 2016
R. Dwivedi et al.: A non-invertible cancelable fingerprint template generation based on ridge feature transformation
ity (ARM), pre-image attack, cross-matching attack,
distinguishing attack and annealing attack. The secu-
rity analysis demonstrates that the proposed approach
fulfills the desired criteria and is robust enough to
sustain such attacks.
6) The performance of the proposed method is evaluated
with two different protocols (FVC and 1VS1) for all
datasets (i.e. DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4) of FVC2002,
FVC2004 and FVC2006 databases. The experimental
results demonstrate that our approach outperforms
existing approaches.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we briefly summarize the existing methods related to
the generation of cancelable fingerprint template. Section
III describes the procedural steps of the proposed method.
Section IV demonstrates experimental results as well as
compares the proposed method with the existing cancelable
template generation approaches. Section V provides the
security analysis of our method. Conclusions and direction
of future research are presented in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, several methods have been introduced to
generate the cancelable template in the literature. Ratha et
al. [21] first introduced the notion of cancelable biometric
with three different types of transformations (Cartesian,
polar and functional) to provide privacy and security to the
original biometric information. The cartesian transformation
method maps the fingerprint minutiae into cells of fixed
size. The minutiae positions in the cells are permuted
to derive the cancelable template. In polar transformation
method, the minutiae positions are mapped onto a polar
coordinate space. Further, the coordinate space is divided
into sectors, and sector positions are shuffled based on a
key to generate the cancelable template. Functional transfor-
mation method alters the minutiae positions and orientation
based on a parametric Gaussian function. Quan et al. [1]
proved that the functional transformation could be cracked
if the parameters and transformed template are revealed. The
rest two transformations cater with high Equal Error Rate
(EER). Moreover, all these methods require core-point for
alignment before the transformation, and the determination
of core-point is not always feasible.
Boult et al. [22] proposed secure biotokens for finger-
print template protection. The method constructs a minutiae
pair table which contains distance, relative orientation, and
orientation of the line connecting two minutiae points. The
features are then divided into quotient and modulus part. The
quotient part is encrypted using RSA algorithm and modulus
part is concatenated with the encrypted quotient to form
a cluster. In verification stage, minutiae pair tables of the
query and stored templates are traversed to construct clusters
and to compute the comparison scores. Lee et al. [23]
proposed an alignment-free protected fingerprint template
generation scheme using minutia orientation. They applied
two different changing functions (i.e., positions and respec-
tive orientations) which are used to secure the minutiae
information. The stored template can thus be regenerated
and revoked by altering the input parameters of the changing
functions in the situation of compromise. In BioHashing
based approaches [6], [7], the protected template is derived
after discretizing the inner product of the biometric features
with the projection matrix. Yang et al. [24] proposed a
non-linear dynamic random projection scheme to increase
the computational complexity against the inversion attack.
Instead of conventional random projection utilized by Bio-
Hashing, the projection matrix is dynamically constructed
based on an index vector which is constructed from the
quantization of the biometric feature vector. Lee et al. [12]
presented a method to derive cancelable fingerprint template
based on 3-D array mapping. In this work, a minutia from
the minutiae set is assigned as the reference, and remaining
minutiae are aligned with respect to the reference minutiae.
Then, the aligned minutiae points are mapped into a 3-D
array, based on the positions (x-y co-ordinate) and orienta-
tions of the minutiae points. The cells in the 3-D array are
marked as 1, which include minutiae points. The array is
sequentially traversed to derive a bit-string. The derived bit-
string is exploited to random permutation utilizing a user-
specific PIN and minutiae type. Wang et al. [25] proposed a
template protection mechanism where many-to-one mapping
is applied onto the pair-minutiae based bit-string evaluated
using the method proposed by Lee et al. [12]. Then, the
user-specific PIN is applied to the complex vector derived
by discrete Fourier transform on bit-string. Wang et al. [10]
proposed another method for cancelable fingerprint template
design using circular convolution. The procedure adopted till
bit-string generation is identical to it’s earlier method [25].
Then, a random sequence is derived by utilizing a user-
specific PIN. Bit-string and random sequence are exploited
to discrete Fourier transform and product of both DFT’s are
computed. The cancelable template is stored by applying
inverse-DFT and removing the first (p − 1) points from
the output. Das et al. [13] constructed a graph structure
based on the minimum possible distance from core/delta
point to remaining minutiae points. Correspondence search
algorithms [13] are used for verification of query template.
Liu et al. [14] proposed a template protection scheme
which derives a protected fixed-length template viz., random
local region descriptor (RLRD). In this scheme, a random
reference point is selected initially. Next, Tico’s sampling
structure [14] is utilized to generate uniformly distributed
sampling point structure around the random reference. The
order of the sampling points is decided through a random
seed. Finally, a protected template is derived as the angular
width between the reference and sampling points. Further,
gray-code encoding of sine and cosine of angular width is
performed to generate a bit-string. Wong et al. [26] proposed
a multi-line code (MLC) for minutiae-based fingerprint
template protection which is an extension of Wong et al.
[11] work. In this method, the minutia set is divided into
angular partitions with respect to a straight line drawn at
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the reference minutiae. Next, few sample points with equal
distance to each other are taken with uniform distribution
on the straight line. Circles are constructed on each of the
sample points, and minutiae points falling in each lower
region (semi-circle) are counted. A binary string is derived
considering 1 if the count is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise.
The result is stored as the cancelable template. In their
extended work [26], the mean distance from minutiae to
the line is computed in each semicircle along the lines.
The quantization is performed over the mean distances. The
binary string is derived and permuted with a user-specific
PIN to generate the cancelable template. Ahmad et al. [8]
proposed a cancelable fingerprint template design scheme
using many-to-one sector mapping for relative minutiae
information in the polar coordinate system as described in
[9].
Farooq et al. [15] proposed a triangular transformation
which derives a binary representation of minutiae features.
The method utilizes the minutiae triplet features: length of
each side, the angle subtended between each side, each
minutiae orientation in the triplet and the height of triplet.
These features are quantized into 24 bits to derive a 224-
bit binary representation. Sutcu et al. [19] introduced a
geometric design which represents minutiae information
into a fixed length string. The method computes mean of
minutiae x and y coordinate as centroid. Next, a circle is con-
structed centered at centroid and divided into an arc of equal
angular width. Then, a straight line is drawn in between
each minutiae pair and intersection with the circumference
is marked. The number of intersection mark is collected
sequentially for each arc to derive the transformed template.
Wang et al. [27] proposed a scheme which utilizes DFT for
pair-minutiae bit string. Further, the complex sequence is
fed to Finite-Impulse-Response (FIR) with a user-specific
key to derive the protected template. The method performs
optimally yet weak against attack via record multiplicity
(ARM). In their future work, Wang et al. [28] proposed
a partial Hadamard based transformation the to protect
original pair minutiae bit-string.
Cappelli et al. [16] introduced a state-of-the-art Minutiae
Cylinder Code (MCC) algorithm which frames a 3-D cylin-
drical structure around minutiae neighborhood considering
each minutia as a reference. Each cylinder of height 2pi and
radius r is tessellated into a number of cells. Each cell stores
the minutiae position and orientation in the neighborhood
of each minutia taken as a reference at a time. A cylinder
which contains less valid information is discarded. Two
cylinders are verifiable if direction difference between two
minutiae is less than a certain value. MCC is a fixed radius
local minutiae construct which provides notable recognition
performance. However, high computation cost of cell con-
struction for each cylinder is the drawback associated with
this method. Ferrara et al. [17] then proved that few genuine
minutiae points (approximately 25.4%) could be correctly
revealed by calculating likelihood between two cylinders.
Later, a novel representation namely Protected-MCC (P-
MCC) is proposed where a non-invertible transform has
been applied onto MCC template incorporating binary-KL
projection which provides a greater level of security and
privacy.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
This section describes our proposed method to derive the
protected fingerprint template. The overall design flow for
the proposed method is displayed in Fig. 1. The proposed
method consists of three major tasks which are displayed in
rectangles in the block diagram. First, the input fingerprint
image is preprocessed to extract the minutiae points by
utilizing the thinned fingerprint image. Next, we form a
nearest neighbor structure around each minutiae point using
the ridge-based co-ordinate system and compute the ridge
features from the thinned image and minutiae information.
Thereafter, we apply Cantor pairing function to encode
the ridge features uniquely. Finally, the random projection
is applied onto the paired output to derive the protected
template. In the verification phase, the same mechanism
is followed to generate the protected query template from
the query fingerprint and comparison is performed between
the protected enrolled and protected query templates in the
transformed (cancelable) domain.
A. PRE-PROCESSING AND MINUTIAE EXTRACTION
Fingerprint images may have different levels of contrast
throughout the image. Pre-processing is performed to en-
hance the quality of input fingerprint image subsequently
reducing the noise. In literature, different methods have been
proposed to reduce noise and detect minutiae points from
input fingerprint image. In this work, the pre-processing and
extraction of minutiae points are performed by following the
method presented in [29]. The extracted minutiae points are
denoted as follows:
Vup = {mi}ni=1
mi = (xi, yi, θi)
(1)
where, Vup represents the set of untransformed (raw) minu-
tia points detected from the input fingerprint and n is the
total number of minutiae points in Vup. The ith minutiae
point is denoted by mi where (xi, yi) and θi are the
coordinate positions and orientation, respectively. Also, a
thinned fingerprint image is obtained during preprocessing
step which is further used for the invariant features extrac-
tion.
B. NEAREST NEIGHBOR STRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION
We use minutiae information to create the nearest neighbor
structure on the thinned fingerprint image. First, one of the
minutiae point from Vup is selected as a reference minutia.
Next, the nearest neighbor structure is formed in the vicinity
of reference minutiae point considering the ridge-based co-
ordinate system as depicted in Fig. 2(a). In the ridge-
based co-ordinate system, reference axis coincides with the
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FIGURE 1: Block diagram of the proposed method
orientation of the selected reference minutiae. Further, we
divide the fingerprint region into ‘s’ sectors of equal angular
width around the reference minutia in an anti-clockwise
direction. In each sector, the nearest neighbor minutiae point
is identified by selecting the minimum distance from the
reference minutiae point. This procedure is followed for all
minutiae points in Vup. It may be noted that if there is no
minutia located in any of the sectors, we assign the nearest
neighbor to be 0 in that sector. Further, we do not take
into account the sectors with no minutiae point at the time
of comparison. We consider eight sectors (s = 8) in our
method as shown in Fig. 2(a). In Fig. 2(a), m2 is the nearest
neighbor of reference minutiae m1 in sector 3.
C. RIDGE FEATURE COMPUTATION
The accuracy of the fingerprint-based verification system
could be affected by translation, rotation and scale defor-
mations produced while acquisition. Hence, it is necessary
to compute invariant features from the input fingerprint
image. In this work, we consider ridge count and average
ridge orientation between the nearest neighbor minutiae and
the reference minutiae in each sector as invariant features.
To compute these features, the reference minutiae and the
nearest neighbor minutiae points are identified first. Then,
we compute the number of ridges along the straight line
between these two minutiae in the thinned image and denote
the ridge count in jth sector as rcj . Figure 2(a) shows
a descriptive example where ridge count between nearest
neighbor minutiae (m2) and the reference minutiae (m1) is
2. To compute ridge orientation, a tangent is drawn at the
intersection point of the line and ridge. Next, we measure the
angle subtended by the tangent and straight lines between
two minutiae points for each ridge crossing the straight line.
For example, the orientation (θk11 ) of the first ridge in the
first sector as shown in Fig. 2(b) is evaluated as:
θk11 = θ
r1
1 − θ1
where θ1, denotes the slope of the line connecting nearest
neighbor minutiae to the reference minutiae in the first
sector. θr11 is the angle subtended by the tangent line from
the first ridge crossing and the reference axis. In a similar
manner, we calculate the orientation θk21 of the second ridge
in the first sector and compute the mean ridge orientation
for the first sector. The mean ridge orientation for the jth
sector, denoted as roj is calculated using Eq. (2).
roj = round
 (θr1j −θj)+(θr2j −θj)+........+(θrNRjj −θj)
NRj
 (2)
where, NRj represents the total number of ridges between
the reference and nearest minutiae in the jth sector. Simi-
larly, we find ridge count and mean ridge orientation for all
minutiae and store it as
〈
〈rcij , roij〉sj=1
〉n
i=1
, where s is the
number of sectors and n is the total number of minutiae.
D. CANTOR PAIRING FUNCTION
The Cantor pairing function [30], [31] is utilized to uniquely
encode two natural numbers into a single natural number.
Let N = 0, 1, 2, 3,.... be the set of positive integers and N×
N be the set of all ordered pairs of non-negative integers,
a bijection from N × N to N is called the Cantor pairing
function which is defined as in Eq. (3).
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Sector 3Sector 4
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(a) Nearest neighbor structure onto ridge-based coordi-
nate system
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2
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k
1
1
r 2
1
rθ1
m1
m2
(b) Ridge-based feature computation
FIGURE 2: Ridge feature extraction
Consider a function: pi : N× N→ N
such that:
pi(k1, k2) :=
1
2
(k1 + k2)(k1 + k2 + 1) + k2∀ (k1, k2) ∈ N2
(3)
We apply this function to encode ridge features. For
each minutiae point, we compute the paired output of ridge
features (rc and ro) for each sector and stored in a 2D
matrix as defined in Eq. (4).
CP (i, j) = 12 (rcij + roij) (rcij + roij + 1) + roij
∀ i ∈ [1, n] and j ∈ [1, s] (4)
where, rci,j and roi,j represent the ridge features (i.e.
ridge count and mean ridge orientation) between the nearest
minutiae in the jth sector corresponding to ith reference
minutiae. CP (i, j) is paired output of ridge features of
the jth sector with respect to the ith reference minutiae.
Next, we apply pointwise logarithm operation onto the
paired outputs to obtain uniform distribution. Log function is
defined in Eq. (5) and the base (b) of log function is chosen
empirically (for details see Section III(C)). For instance, if
an input fingerprint image comprising n minutiae points is
divided into ‘s’ sectors, the matrix CP would result into
n×s entries. After applying the log function, we obtain the
log template (LT) of size n× s.
LT (i, j) = logb (CP (i, j)) (5)
E. RANDOM PROJECTION
In order to derive non-invertible and revocable cancelable
template, we perform random projection onto log template
(LT ). A random projection matrix (RP ) of size s × t is
derived using a random seed, κ where t < s. Moreover, each
of the entries of RP is computed from a Gaussian indepen-
dent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) with unit variance and
mean is equal to zero. Now, each row of log template (LT )
is projected onto random projection matrix (RP ) to derive
the cancelable template (CT ) of size n× t as shown in Eq.
(6).
CT = LT.RP (6)
where, rank(RP )=r.
In linear algebra, a theorem of linear systems [32] claims
a unique solution when ranks of the coefficient matrix as
well as the augmented matrix are same. Further, if rank
becomes lower than the unknowns present, the linear system
leads to infinite solutions as confirmed in the following
proposition. Hence, RP is one of those infinite solutions
of Eq. (6).
Proposition 1: A linear non-homogeneous system of
equations such as CT = LT.RP including s unknowns
and n equations contain an infinite number of solutions.
Proof: Initially, we claim that CT = LT.RP is solvable.
It is evident from Eq. (6) that CT is a linear combination
of columns of RP , which states that CT lies in the column
space of RP . Hence, rank(RP )=rank([RP CT ]). Due to
same rank of coefficient matrix and augmented matrix, a
solution exists for CT = LT.RP .
Next, since rank(RP )= r < t, there are infinitely many
possible solutions to Eq. (6). The proposition illustrates that
CT is concealed among infinitely many possible solutions
which become infeasible to an attacker even if he/she unveils
CT and RP . The attacker would not be able to achieve true
biometric template as evaluation of pseudo-inverse results
obsolete as shown in the following example:
Example: Suppose, we have one row of log template and
random projection matrix as follows:
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LT =
[
2.5 1.3 3 4.51
]
and RP =
 1.52 −2.72 4.28 −3.23 −1.3 0.69 −2.1
−0.76 1.36 −2.14 1.6

Hence, rank(RP )=2 and
CT = LT ×RP = [−1.328 −1.591 −0.664]
is corresponding protected template.
Let piLT represents the pseudo-inverse LT .
p
iLT is computed
as:
p
iLT = RP
† · CT=[-0.3579 0.0993 0.0240 0.1927],
where, RP † denotes pseudo-inverse of RP . Concurrently,
we evaluate another solution manually,
p
iLT
‡=[0 0 0.3396 0.8692]. Hence, it is verified that piLT×
RP = CT and piLT
‡ ×RP = CT .
This random projection based transformation guarantees
the privacy and security of the proposed method. An im-
poster has no clue about LT even if the protected template
gets compromised. Further, if we consider the worst case of
stolen CT and RP , it would be very hard to retrieve LT
from infinitely many possible solutions. We illustrate this
with a mathematical proof [33]:
Proposition 2: An underdetermined system of linear
equations either contains an infinite number of solutions or
become inconsistent.
Proof: Consider this linear and underdetermined system,
CT = LT.RP (see Eq. (6)).
We assume that CT = LT × RP has infinitely many
solutions. Let P be the n× s matrix,
P =

1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 · · · 0 0
· · · · · · ·
· · · · · · ·
· · · · · · ·
0 0 · · · 1 0

n×s
We define RˆP := P.RP . Further we evaluate,
L¯T = min
x
‖P.RP − CT‖22
subject to the constraint ‖LT.RP − CT‖22 = 0. For
evaluation of L¯T , the (λLTTLT + PTP )−1 must exist
for all λ > 0, this is non-trivial. Hence, L¯T achieved may
look similar as LT , but it would not be identical.
The user’s original information cannot be compromised
even if an adversary obtains the stored fingerprint template
because of the randomness present in the RP . The steps
for cancelable template generation are summarized in Al-
gorithm 1.
F. COMPARISON
The comparison between enrolled and query templates is
performed in the protected domain to maintain secrecy.
We compute local and global similarity to evaluate overall
comparison score. We use Dice coefficient to measure the
Algorithm 1 Cancelable template generation
Input: Log template (LTn×s), random projection matrix
(RPs×t) // Select a seed, κ to generate random
projection matrix RPs×t where t < s
Output: Cancelable template (CTn×t)
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: for j = 1 to t do
3: Initialize sum=0;
4: for k = 1 to s do
5: sum ← sum + LT (i, k)×RP (k, j)
6: end for
7: CT (i, j) ← sum
8: end for
9: end for
10: return CTn×t
local similarity between the enrolled and query templates as
utilized in [26]. Finally, the likelihood of the enrolled and
query template being the two fingerprint of the same subject
is measured to compute global similarity score.
1) Local similarity score
Let us consider, the enrolled and query protected templates
are denoted by CTn×t and QTm×t respectively where m
and n represents the number of minutiae in the query
and enrolled templates, respectively. To evaluate the local
similarity score, each row of the CT is cross-matched with
all rows in QT by computing the inner product of CT (i, :)
and QT (j, :) where i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , n and j ∈ 1, 2, · · · ,m. We
obtain a similarity matrix sim(i, j) ∈ Rn×m after applying
the Eq. (7).
sim (i, j) =
2CT (i, :) ·QT (j, :)
‖CT (i, :)‖2 + ‖QT (j, :)‖2 (7)
where i ∈ [1, n] and j ∈ [1,m].
The ith row of CT and the jth row of QT are con-
sidered to be verifiable if and only if sim(i, j) = max
([sim(i, 1), sim(i, 2), ....., sim(i, n)]) and sim(i, j) = max
([sim(1, j), sim(2, j), ....., sim(m, j)]) are valid simultane-
ously. Therefore, each of the entries in similarity matrix is
re-evaluated to eliminate double comparison in the following
manner:
Let,
ΓCT = [ΓCT (1), . . . ,ΓCT (i), . . .ΓCT (n)] (8a)
where, ΓCT (i) = max(sim(i, 1), . . . , sim(i,m)
and
ΓQT = [ΓQT (1), . . . ,ΓQT (i), . . . ,ΓQT (m)] (8b)
where, ΓQT (j) = max(sim(1, j), . . . , sim(n, j)
be the maximum scores acquired for all minutiae in CT and
QT , respectively. Next, we construct a binary mask A ∈
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{0, 1}n×m, which records the positions of the coinciding
maxima;
A(i, j) = δ(ΓCT (i) == ΓQT (j)) (9)
where δ(·) returns 1 when the nested condition is true
and 0, otherwise. Hence, the filtered similarity matrix is
represented by:
Sˆ = simA (10)
where,  represents element-wise multiplication.
2) Global similarity score
To perform overall comparison score between CT and QT ,
the likelihood of CT and QT being two instances of the
same fingerprint is measured. From the similarity matrix
(Sˆ) obtained in Eq. (11), we calculate the comparison score
(S) with the following equation:
S =
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 Ŝ(i, j)
min(m,n)
(11)
Algorithm 2 describes the overall comparison procedure.
Algorithm 2 Comparison
Input: Cancelable template (CTn×t), Query template
(QTm×t)
Output: Comparison score (match_score)
Initialize : sim(n,m)← 0, S(n,m)← 0
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: RM1← CT [i]
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: RM2← QT [j]
5: // Evaluate similarity score as described in Eq. (7)
6: sim[i, j] = InnerProduct(RM1, RM2)
7: end for
8: end for
9: ΓCT ← [ΓCT (1), . . . ,ΓCT (i), . . .ΓCT (n)]
where, ΓCT (i) = max(sim(i, 1), . . . , sim(i,m)
10: ΓQT ← [ΓQT (1), . . . ,ΓQT (i), . . . ,ΓQT (m)]
where, ΓQT (j) = max(sim(1, j), . . . , sim(n, j)
11: for i = 1 to n do
12: for j = 1 to m do
13: S[i, j] ← (ΓCT [i] = ΓQT [j]) // Re-evaluate
similarity score to avoid double comparison as
described in Eq. (9)
14: end for
15: end for
16: sim← sim ·∗ S
17: match_score(S) = sum(sim(:))min(m,n) // Evaluate Eq. (11)
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the details of experimental design
and results to illustrate the performance of the proposed
method. We also analyze the effect of the different param-
eters as well as comparison with the existing approaches.
A. DATABASE SELECTION
We have conducted our experiment on publicly available
fingerprint databases FVC2002, FVC2004, and FVC2006
and each database contain four sets namely, DB1, DB2,
DB3, and DB4 since most of the authors of biometrics
research community utilize FVC databases [34]. Each set
of the first two databases comprise of 100 subjects with
8 images per subject. Each set of the FVC2006 database
includes 140 subjects with 12 images per subject.
B. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In accordance with the ISO standard [35], we use the
following four metrics to evaluate the performance of our
method:
1) FMR: The probability of getting a positive comparison
decision for an imposter
2) FNMR: The probability of getting a negative compar-
ison decision for a genuine user
3) GMR: Can be calculated as 1-FNMR
4) EER: The error rate where FMR and FNMR hold
equality
The computation of these performance metrics involves the
evaluation of genuine and imposter scores. Genuine score
refers to the comparison of a fingerprint impression of a sub-
ject with the other impressions of the same subject, whereas
imposter score is derived by comparing a fingerprint im-
pression of each subject against the fingerprint impressions
of all other subjects. Also, we have used standard FVC
protocol and 1VS1 protocol to compute the performance
of our method.
In the 1VS1 protocol, the first fingerprint image of each
subject is compared with the second fingerprint image of
the same subject to compute the FNMR. To measure the
FMR, the first image of each subject is compared with
the first image of other subjects. This results to measure
100 genuine and 100C2 =4950 imposter scores for each set
of the FVC2002 and FVC2004 databases. For each set of
FVC2006 database, 140 genuine and 140C2=9730 imposter
scores are computed.
In the FVC protocol, each fingerprint image of a subject is
compared with the remaining fingerprint images of the same
subject to compute the FNMR and to evaluate the FMR, the
first fingerprint image of each subject is compared with the
first fingerprint image of the different subjects. This results
in providing 8C2 × 100=2800 genuine and 100C2=4950
imposter scores computation for each set of FVC2002 and
FVC2004 databases. For each set of FVC2006, 12C2 ×
140=9240 genuine and 140C2=9730 imposter scores are
computed.
C. VALIDATION OF PARAMETERS
The proposed method utilizes two parameters to derive
the protected fingerprint template. These parameters are:
number of sectors (s) in the nearest neighbor structure [see
section III(B)] and log-base value (b) [see section III(D)]. In
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TABLE 1: Number of sectors in nearest neighbor structure
Angular
width
Number of
sectors (s)
EER (in %)
FVC2002
DB1
FVC2004
DB3
FVC2006
DB1
15 24 5.03 7.89 11.32
30 12 3.91 6.75 8.03
45 8 1.75 3.97 5.14
60 6 2.17 4.64 6.38
90 4 3.81 5.44 7.19
this section, we highlight the impact of these parameters on
the performance of our approach. We have validated these
parameters with respect to dataset DB1 of FVC2002, DB3
of FVC2004 and DB1 of FVC2006 using FVC protocol
since they have good quality images.
1) Number of sectors (s): After conducting pre-
processing steps, we divide input fingerprint image
into s number of sectors with an equal angular width
in the ridge-based co-ordinate system. To validate the
parameter s, we have performed exhaustive testing
considering the different angular widths with 15◦
interval. We have considered s = 24, 12,. . . and 4
corresponding to angular width 15◦, 30◦, . . . and 90◦,
respectively. To carry out this experiment, we have
considered log-base value (b) as 1.2. The performance
is measured with respect to EER and results are re-
ported in Table 1. It has been observed that the method
gives the best result for s =8 on dataset DB1 of
FVC2002, DB3 of FVC2004 and DB1 of FVC2006.
The small value of s degrades the performance of
the method as the transformation becomes sensitive to
noise. We also observe that EER increases for large
values of s as there are more sectors with 0 minutiae
points. Hence, we have considered s = 8 for all other
experimental evaluations.
2) Log-base value (b): We apply the log function onto the
paired output derived using Cantor pairing function
to obtain the uniform features distribution. We have
conducted a number of experiments by considering the
different values of b = 1.1, 1.2, 1.3,..., 2 and measured
the performance in terms of EER for dataset DB1 of
FVC2002, DB3 of FVC2004 and DB1 of FVC2006
as reported in Table 2. The experimental evaluation
illustrates that the method performs the best on b =
1.2. We observe that small value of b amplifies the
distribution of paired output reducing EER. Also, EER
gets increases as the discrimination between features
of the different subjects gets reduced for high values
of b. Therefore, we consider b=1.2 to evaluate the
performance of our method.
D. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To measure the performance of our method, we have
conducted two sets of experiments. We evaluate the per-
formance under the same key and different key scenario
in the first and second set of experiments, respectively.
TABLE 2: EER for different values of b
Log-base
(b)
EER (in %)
FVC2002
DB1
FVC2004
DB3
FVC2006
DB1
1.1 2.13 4.03 6.84
1.2 1.75 3.97 5.14
1.3 2.43 4.87 7.04
1.4 4.07 5.13 8.93
1.5 5.51 6.83 9.94
1.6 6.91 8.03 11.53
1.7 8.12 10.23 13.18
1.8 10.03 11.89 14.91
1.9 11.36 13.97 16.12
2 12.89 14.64 17.9
Each experiment is conducted 10 times, and the average
performance of 10 trials is reported in the paper.
1) Same key scenario
This scenario represents the situation in practice when an
imposter unveils the random projection matrix (RP ). We
have evaluated this scenario by assigning the same RP
to each user present in the database. The ROC curves for
FVC2002, FVC2004, and FVC2006 databases with FVC
and 1VS1 protocols are shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5,
respectively.
FVC2002: For FVC2002 database, we achieve an EER of
1.75, 0.98, 4.02, and 3.74 for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4
datasets, respectively using FVC protocol. For 1VS1 proto-
col, we obtain an EER of 0, 0.13, 3.39, and 3.02 for DB1,
DB2, DB3, and DB4, respectively. Out of all FVC2002
datasets, the method exhibit low EER on DB1 and DB2 for
both protocols due to the presence of more number of good
quality images as compared to other datasets of FVC2002.
Further, 1st and 2nd images of a subject in FVC2002 DB2
are acquired in the same session and have less variation
and distortion than the other six images. However, images
in DB3 and DB4 dataset of FVC2002 contain relatively
poor quality images with less number of minutiae points as
compared to dataset DB1 and DB2. As a result, we achieve
high EER for DB3 and DB4 datasets under both protocols.
FVC2004: For FVC2004 database, we achieve an EER
of 4.38, 6.59, 3.97, and 3.16 for DB1, DB2, DB3, and
DB4 datasets, respectively using FVC protocol. In the 1VS1
protocol, we obtain an EER of 4.02, 5.77, 3.88, and 3.04
for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4, respectively. The method
performs better on DB4, out of all FVC2004 datasets in
both protocols. However, the method gives a high value of
EER on DB2 for both protocols as the first two images of
the DB2 dataset are heavily distorted. Moreover, the small
overlap area corresponding to the images of stored and query
templates is another reason for less accuracy on FVC2004
DB2. For example, if we consider the images of stored
and query template, as 96_1.tif and 96_2.tif, the genuine
verification attempt fails. This is because 96_1.tif contains
the region below the core point, whereas 96_2.tif contains
region above the core point. The absence of overlapping
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FIGURE 3: ROC curves for FVC2002 datasets under FVC and 1VS1 protocol
area causes very few or zero corresponding minutiae from
the stored and query templates. Since the proposed system
relies on minutiae neighborhood, the lack of corresponding
minutiae pair from the stored and query template pair causes
comparison trial to fail. We achieve high EER for all four
datasets of the FVC2004 database since all the users were
requested to put deliberate perturbations at the time of
acquisition [34].
FVC2006: For FVC2006 dataset, we achieve an EER of
5.14, 0.14, 1.63, and 0.49 for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4,
respectively using FVC protocol. For 1VS1 protocol, we
obtain an EER of 3.8, 0.09, 2.02, and 1.03 for DB1, DB2,
DB3, and DB4, respectively. All of the four datasets are
selected among the heterogeneous populations (i.e., manual
workers and elderly people) allowing most difficult finger-
prints according to quality index with explicit distortions
such as large amounts of rotation and displacement, wet/dry
impressions, etc. The dataset DB1 contains small sized
poor quality images with missing minutiae. Therefore, the
method produces high EER on the DB1 dataset. The method
performs optimally on the DB2 dataset for both protocols
due to the presence of relatively good quality images.
Dataset DB3 and DB4 consist of more number of poor
quality images in comparison to dataset DB2. Therefore,
it is observed that the performance of the method degrades
for DB3 and DB4 of the FVC2006 dataset.
Further, we also observe that the proposed method per-
forms better with 1VS1 protocol compared to standard
FVC protocol. The reason lies in the number of genuine
verification attempts. In case of 1VS1 protocol, the first
two images of the same user are utilized, whereas all
eight images from each user are utilized in the genuine
verification for the standard FVC protocol. However, we
achieve high EER for 1VS1 protocol as compared to FVC
protocol for the DB3 and DB4 datasets of the FVC2006
database since the first two images are noisy and involve
non-overlapping regions.
2) Different key scenario
In the second set of experiment, we assign the different
projection matrices to the different users by altering the
seed value and test our method for both the protocols. For
FVC2002 dataset, our method performs ideal for all datasets
(EER = 0) with both protocols. Moreover, we achieve an
EER of 0 for DB1 and DB2 datasets of FVC2004. Datasets
DB3 and DB4 consist of more number of poor quality
images with very few or missing minutiae in comparison
to datasets DB1 and DB2. For DB3 and DB4 dataset,
the method gives EERs of 0.08 and 0.03, respectively.
For FVC2006 dataset, we achieve an EER close to 0 for
DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 using FVC and 1VS1 protocols.
Therefore, it is evident that the performance of the method
in the different key scenario is almost ideal for all datasets.
E. COMPARISON OF WITH AND WITHOUT
TRANSFORMATION
To perform a fair comparison, the verification performance
of the proposed cancelable biometric system is analyzed
with respect to the baseline biometric system (i.e., original
ridge features). Further, a comparison process relying on
the original minutiae should be taken into account, since
the employed ridge-based representation is already part of
the process generating the proposed protected templates.
Therefore, we compare the performance of the method under
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FIGURE 4: ROC curves for FVC2004 datasets under FVC and 1VS1 protocol
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FIGURE 5: ROC curves for FVC2006 datasets under FVC and 1VS1 protocol
three scenarios i.e. original minutiae comparison, original
ridge features and protected templates. In this experiment,
first we compute the performance for original minutiae
comparison based on adaptive image enhancement method
proposed by Bartunek et al. [36]. The approach involves
publicly available Bozorth3 minutiae matcher [37] from
NIST to evaluate the performance. Next, we compute the
performance using original ridge features of the query and
stored templates. Further, we apply the proposed approach to
derive cancelable template and compare the stored and query
templates in the transformed domain. Table 3 reports the
EERs obtained from the original minutiae comparison, orig-
inal ridge features and the cancelable (protected) fingerprint
template for the different datasets. It has been observed that
the proposed ridge-based computation outperforms the orig-
inal minutiae comparison since Bozorth3 does not perform
well for poor quality fingerprint images with fewer minutiae
points. Also, Bozorth3 is not robust against the alignment,
and scale deformations present between the stored and query
templates. Therefore, it is evident that the proposed method
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outperforms than the Bozorth3 matcher.
For FVC protocol, the reported results in Table 3 exhibit
that there is a minor degradation of 0.19%, 0.15%, 0.05%
and 0.07% in the performance for DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4
of FVC2002, 0.053%, 0.07%, 0.033%, 0.04% for DB1,
DB2, DB3, DB4 of FVC2004 and 0.04%, 0.14%, 0.037%,
0.32% for DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4 of FVC2006, respec-
tively with reference to original ridge features. For 1VS1
protocol, the reported results in Table 4 indicate that the
performance is degraded by 0%, 0.85%, 0.08% and 0.09%
for DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4 of FVC2002, 0.05%, 0.11%,
0.04%, 0.05% for DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4 of FVC2004
and 0.048%, 2.0%, 0.09%, 0.17% for DB1, DB2, DB3,
DB4 of FVC2006, respectively with reference to original
ridge features. Therefore, we can conclude that performance
degradation produced by the transformation is very low.
F. COMPARISON WITH THE EXISTING CANCELABLE
BIOMETRIC APPROACHES
The approaches in [8], [22]–[25], [27], [28] used FVC
2002 database to evaluate the performance of their method
using standard FVC protocol. Further, Wong et al. [11]
also evaluated the performance on DB1 of FVC2004.
In addition to each dataset of FVC2002, Ferrara et al.
[17], [18] evaluated their methods on DB1 of FVC2004
and DB2 of FVC2006. The authors, Yang et al. [24]
and Wang et al. [27] evaluated the performance on
DB2 of FVC2002 with the 1VS1 protocol. Ferrara et
al. [17], [18] also evaluated their methods on DB2 of
FVC2006 and each datasets of FVC2002 database for
1VS1 protocol. Therefore, we compare our method with
these current state-of-the-art approaches [8], [11], [17],
[18], [22]–[25], [27], [28] in the literature. Table 5 and 6
summarizes the comparison in terms of EER on different
FVC datasets for 1VS1 and FVC protocols, respectively.
From Table 5, we observe that the best result reported
in existing literature is EER = 0, 0.02, 3.43, 3.37 and
0.03 for FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3,
FVC2002DB4 and FVC2006DB2, respectively, whereas
our approach yields EER of 0, 0.13, 3.39, 3.02 and
0.09 for FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3,
FVC2002DB4 and FVC2006DB2, respectively. From
Table 6, we observe that the best result reported in
existing literature is EER = 1, 0.99, 5.24, 4.84, 10.36 and
0.17 for FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3,
FVC2002DB4, FVC2004DB1 and FVC2006DB2,
respectively, whereas our approach gives EER of 1.75, 0.98,
4.02, 3.74, 4.38 and 0.14 for FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2,
FVC2002DB3, FVC2002DB4, FVC2004DB1 and
FVC2006DB2, respectively. However, we can observe
that the performance of the proposed method for the DB2
dataset of FVC2002 and FVC2006 is slightly lower than
[17] in 1VS1 protocol and the EER of FVC2002DB1 is
lower than that of Wang et al. [28], but it is comparable.
Therefore, it is evident from the reported results that the
performance of our proposed approach performs better over
the existing template protection techniques.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of the derived protected template is guaranteed
when an adversary has no information about the transfor-
mation. If an adversary unveils any information about can-
celable transformation, the security of the proposed system
is guaranteed by three factors: non-invertibility, revocability,
and diversity. In this section, we analyze our method with
respect to these three contexts.
A. NON-INVERTIBILITY
The term, non-invertibility refers that it should be compu-
tationally infeasible to derive the original fingerprint tem-
plate from the protected template. Note that a randomized
projection matrix (RP ) is utilized to generate a cancelable
template from the log template (LT ). To meet the non-
invertibility requirement, we have adopted a reference archi-
tecture proposed by Breebaart et al. [4]. Figure 6 shows the
reference architecture where the protected template (CT ),
random projection matrix (RP ), and the parameters (s,
b) can be presumed as pseudo-identity, auxiliary data and
supplementary data, respectively.
In the reference architecture, the protected template (CT )
is derived at the enrollment phase. The biometric sample,
ridge features and the parameter (s, b) are destroyed after
the successful verification of stored protected and query
protected templates. Due to privacy preservation, it may
have been either issued for a limited period or may require
revocation when compromised. Moreover, the biometric
characteristics may get affected due to aging effects. Hence,
it requires renewal after a validity period regulated through
watch list. The protected template CT along with the RP
and supplementary data (s, b) are stored in the database.
During verification, a protected query template (CT
′
) is
generated from the issued RP , biometric sample and the
parameters (s, b). Next, the stored protected template (CT )
and the query protected template (CT
′
) are forwarded
to a comparator/matching server via the communication
interface to verify the identity. In this section, we ana-
lyze the criterion of non-invertibility with three different
architectural components i.e. database, matching server and
communication interface for information exchange.
1) Compromised database
In this scenario, an attacker can reveal the database i.e.
protected template (CT ) and the random projection matrix
(RP ). On the possession of this information, the attacker
would not be able to retrieve the log template (LT ) since
the size of RP is s×t where t < s and the entries of RPs×t
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian
random variables. Evaluation of LTn×s from CTn×t results
to find a solution for underdetermined system because it
is hard to find s unknowns from t linearly independent
equations where t < s (see Proposition 1-2 in Section III-
E). Further, it has also been proved in Du et al. [38] that
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TABLE 3: Baseline comparison for FVC protocol
Dataset
EER
Original minutiae
comparison
Without cancelable
transformation
With cancelable
transformation
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
FVC2002 2.8 2.3 6.5 3.9 1.47 0.89 3.81 3.49 1.75 0.98 4.02 3.74
FVC2004 9.6 5.9 6.2 6.6 4.14 6.12 3.84 3.03 4.38 6.59 3.97 3.16
FVC2006 5.2 1.39 2.91 1.27 4.93 0.12 1.57 0.37 5.14 0.14 1.63 0.49
TABLE 4: Baseline comparison for 1VS1 protocol
Dataset
EER
Original minutiae
comparison
Without cancelable
transformation
With cancelable
transformation
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
FVC2002 0.91 1.02 4.3 3.89 0 0.07 3.13 2.77 0 0.13 3.39 3.02
FVC2004 4.65 6.30 4.72 3.95 3.81 5.19 3.69 2.89 4.02 5.77 3.88 3.04
FVC2006 4.87 1.04 2.65 2.83 3.62 0.03 1.83 0.88 3.8 0.09 2.02 1.03
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FIGURE 6: Reference architecture for the creation, storage and verification of the protection template
TABLE 5: Performance comparison with existing cancelable
approaches for 1VS1 protocol (values in percentages)
Datasets
Methods
Yang
et al. [24]
Ferrara
et al. [17]
Wang
et al. [27]
Proposed
method
FVC
2002
DB1 - 0 3 0
DB2 0.72 0.02 2 0.13
DB3 - 3.43 7 3.39
DB4 - 3.37 - 3.02
FVC
2006 DB2 - 0.03 - 0.09
if the projection matrix follows the condition t ≤ s2 and
entries in RP are i.i.d., it is very hard to find the LT from
CT . Moreover, even if the attacker achieves supplementary
information (s, b), it would be infeasible to unveil the
LT as analyzed in the third scenario i.e. compromised
communication interface.
2) Compromised matching server
Let us assume that an attacker unveils matching server
i.e. stored protected template (CT ) and query protected
template (CT
′
). Next, an attacker tries to evaluate LT by
correlating the information contained in CT and CT
′
. In
this situation, an attacker would not be able to retrieve LT
since he does not have any information about the RP .
3) Compromised communication interface
In this scenario, an attacker may have control over com-
munication interface between the database and matching
server. In this situation, the adversary would be able to
estimate the stored protected template (CT ), query protected
template (CT
′
) and the random projection matrix (RP ). On
the possession of these information, the attacker may utilize
CT and RP , or CT
′
and RP to retrieve the log template
(LT ). This situation is identical to the first scenario i.e.
compromised database. Further, the attacker may correlate
CT and CT
′
to evaluate LT . This situation is same as the
second scenario i.e. compromised matching server.
Further, we assume that the attacker unveils the approx-
imate LT by applying known key distinguishing attack.
In this situation, the imposter tries to estimate CP or
approximate CP using the value of parameter b. However,
it would not be possible to retrieve original ridge features
since the inversion involves the computation of a square root
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TABLE 6: Performance comparison with existing cancelable approaches for FVC protocol (values in percentages)
Datasets
Methods
Ahmad
et al. [8]
Wang
et al. [25]
Lee et al.
[23]
Wong
et al. [11]
Yang
et al. [24]
Boult
et al. [22]
Ferrara
et al. [17]
Ferrara
et al. [18]
Wang
et al. [27]
Wang
et al. [28]
Proposed
method
FVC
2002
DB1 9 3.5 3.4 4.69 - 2.1 1.88 3.3 4 1 1.75
DB2 6 4 - 5.03 4.53 1.2 0.99 1.8 3 2 0.98
DB3 27 7.5 - - - - 5.24 7.8 8.5 5.2 4.02
DB4 - - - - - - 4.84 6.6 - - 3.74
FVC
2004 DB1 - - - 10.36 - - - 6.3 - - 4.38
FVC
2006 DB2 - - - - - - 0.17 0.3 - - 0.14
“− ” indicates that the author(s) have not reported the results or results are reported for partial dataset, in their work.
which gives one to many correspondences as defined in Eq.
12(a)-(d).
w =
⌊√
8 CP + 1− 1
2
⌋
(12a)
t =
w2 + w
2
(12b)
ro = CP − t (12c)
rc = w − ro (12d)
where, rc, ro and CP represent the ridge count, mean ridge
orientation and transformed paired output, respectively. w
and t are the intermediate values in the calculation and bc
is the floor function. Hence, it would not be possible to
invert CP to attain the original ridge features. Therefore,
it can be stated that our method preserves the criterion of
non-invertibility.
B. REVOCABILITY
The term revocability refers to the design of a new pro-
tected template if stored template gets leaked. The newly
generated template should be adequately dissimilar to the
compromised one. In this work, a new protected template
can be issued just by altering RP . To ensure the potent revo-
cability, the biometric templates that are derived by applying
different RP s for the same user in different applications,
should not be able to verify each other. Here, the random
projection is motivated by the Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL)
lemma described in [39]. The lemma states that:
For any 0 <  < 1 and an integer k, let t be a positive
integer such that t ≥ t0 = O (−2log k). For any set B of
k points in <s, there exists a map f : <s → <t such that:
for all u, v ∈ B,
(1− ) ‖u− v‖2 6 ‖f(u)− f(v)‖2 ≤ (1 + ) ‖u− v‖2
(13)
where, u and v are two randomly derived vectors in the s-
dimensional Euclidean space, u, v ∈ <s. For inner-product
based similarity, it states that:
u.v
‖u‖.‖v‖ =
Au.Av
‖Au‖.‖Av‖ ±O()
This lemma provides a proof that the similarity between any
two vectors can be preserved up to a factor of  when these
vectors are projected onto a random t-dimensional subspace.
Such type of mapping can be performed by utilizing a matrix
containing orthonormal columns as described in Lemma 5.2
[40]. The lemma states that:
Let RP be a matrix of size s× t where t < s. Each of the
entries of RP are i.i.d. Gaussian random variable with zero
mean and variance 1s , rij ∼ s(0, 1s ), i=1,· · · ,s , j=1,· · · , t.
Let W = RPTRP and W
′
= RPRPT ; then,
E(wi,j) =
{
1, i = j
0, i 6= j V ar(wi,j) =
{
2
s , i = j
1
s , i 6= j
(14)
E(w
′
i,j) =
{
t
s , i = j
0, i 6= j V ar(w
′
i,j) =
{
2t
s2 , i = j
t
s2 , i 6= j
(15)
where, wi,j and w
′
i,j are elements of W and W
′
, respec-
tively.
The output here confirms that E[RPTRP ] = I , where
I denotes an identity matrix. The elements of RPTRP
are centered around their mean with very small variance.
This suggests that vectors with random directions are close
to orthogonal (i.e. RPTRP ≈ I). Further, it is obvious
that if rij ∼ s(0, 1s ), then, E[‖rj‖2] = E[
∑s
i=1 r
2
ij ] =
1 and V ar[‖rj‖2] = V ar[
∑s
i=1 r
2
ij ] =
2
s , where rj denotes
individual columns of RP . This mathematical proof ensures
that columns in RP are saturated around one which signifies
that the vectors in RP are nearly orthonormal. For revocable
biometric template generation, we evaluate the probability
of false match when the biometric data of the same user
is exploited with the different random projection matrices,
denoted as Pfm. Therefore, the revocability i.e. probability
of a protected template being revocable can be defined as:
Pr = 1−Pfm. The higher value of Pr corresponds to better
revocability. In general, zero Pfm cannot be obtained if we
apply random projection directly onto the biometric data
(LT ). Further, this probability can be reduced by adding an
extra vector d ∈ <s, di >> th to the LT , LT ′ = LT + d,
where th denotes the threshold of verification system [41].
In similar manner, the biometric templates with Pr ≈ 1
could be derived, if different random projection matrices
are exploited on the original template of the same user
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nullifying the record multiplicity attack [1]. In this work, we
achieve Pr= 0.982 corresponding to a threshold, th=0.65.
We also verify this security aspect empirically by gen-
erating 100 different protected templates using 100 dif-
ferent projection matrices from the same finger. Next, we
perform a comparison of these 100 templates with the
originally enrolled template to obtain the pseudo-imposter
scores. We achieve mean and variance of (0.7519; 0.018),
(0.3982; 0.177) and (0.3563; 0.189) for genuine, imposter
and pseudo-imposter distributions, respectively. These val-
ues indicate that mean and variance for the pseudo-imposter
distribution are at a distant to genuine distribution and near
towards the imposter distribution. Moreover, we obtain FMR
= 0, which depicts that all queries are rejected. This signifies
that the derived templates are dissimilar to the enrolled
templates for the same finger. Although, the templates are
generated from the same finger pattern, they are uncorre-
lated to each other. Therefore, the claim of revocability is
preserved.
C. DIVERSITY
The characteristics of diversity state that it should derive
numerous templates and these derived templates should not
provide positive biometric claim over other applications to
avoid cross-matching. In our method, multiple fingerprint
templates can be derived by choosing the different projec-
tion matrices (RP ) with the different seed values (κ). Also,
the two parameters illustrated in Section IV(C); the number
of sectors (s) and log-base value (b) can be utilized to derive
numerous templates. The derived protected templates are
sufficiently different from the raw fingerprint template which
indicates that a user can enroll itself with different templates
in different applications without any cross-matching. Hence,
it has been confirmed that the method validates the property
of diversity.
D. OTHER ATTACKS
We also analyze the possibility of different types of attacks
namely Attacks via Record Multiplicity, pre-image, cross-
matching, distinguishing and annealing attacks to validate
the robustness of the proposed work:
Attack via Record Multiplicity (ARM): This is a scenario
where the attacker employs multiple stolen protected tem-
plates with or without associated parameters to generate
original template [42]. For our approach, it is infeasible
to apply ARM since stored template’s dimensionality is
uncorrelated to the original template’s feature space. Fur-
ther, numerical values in protected template contain both
positive and negative signs due to random projection based
transformation. ARM attacks can be launched where the
multiplication output contains either all positive or all neg-
ative entries. Therefore, the possibility of ARM attack for
the proposed method gets nullified.
Pre-image attack: In this attack, the attacker can utilize
multiple protected instances to derive a pre-image instance.
Knowledge of Security can also be challenged using feature
order with different projection matrices to create a fake
template. Biohashing based methods [6], [7], [43], [44]
derive binary string by projecting feature vectors with user-
specific random numbers. In contrast, the bit-string could be
easily exploited to disclose original minutiae information.
Moreover, the projection matrix in Biohashing is not only
a square matrix but also have orthonormal row vectors
i.e. Rproj · RTproj=I, where RTproj is the pseudo-inverse
of Rproj and I is the identity matrix. This makes the
Biohashing methods vulnerable to pre-image attack. How-
ever, the proposed random projection based transformation
is different to the methods involving Biohashing. Here,
the random projection is utilized to hide the log template
among infinitely many possible solutions. Also, our method
does not depend on the order of feature components while
generating the original as well as the protected template.
Further, any value could not be investigated from the two
projected feature vectors in any position due to the different
sized enrolled and query template. Hence, pre-image attack
could not be utilized to derive the original template in our
method.
Cross-matching attack: The cross-matching attack refers
to the scenario where an adversary is able to compromise
the databases stored in different applications. The protected
templates each from different applications are analyzed to
restore the original template. However, the random projec-
tion transformation described in Eq. (6) avoids any possi-
bility of cross-matching attack across different applications.
The proof for the same has been stated in proposition 1 and
2 of Section III-E.
Distinguishing attack: In distinguishing attack [45], an
imposter tries to utilize the same protected template cap-
tured from the different applications to derive the original
template by correlating the information. To prevent this, the
different protected templates can be utilized in the different
applications. However, the attacker can retrieve the different
protected templates (CT ) along with the known random
projection matrices (RP ) from the different applications in
the known-key distinguishing attack. In this situation, the
attacker would be able to unveil log template (LT ). Further,
he may estimate the paired output (CP ) or approximate CP
using the value of b or approximately equal to b. However,
it is not possible to derive original ridge features since the
Cantor pairing function is irreversible as defined in Eq.
(12a)-(12d) (for details, see Section V-A).
Annealing attack: In this attack [2], the protected template
is divided into multiple regions, and some regions of a sam-
ple template are paired with some regions of the reference
template to evaluate similarity score. If the similarity score
exceeds the threshold, the vicinity corresponding to sample’s
region is included in the gummy template. This step is
repeated until it outputs a gummy template including all
matched vicinities. Our approach is robust against this type
of attack due to the following reasons:
1) Our approach evaluates the nearest neighbor minutia
for each minutiae point causing the different radii to
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the different minutiae points. Hence, it is very hard to
map the gummy template with the original template
which is derived from the multiple regions with the
variable radius.
2) Ridge-based features are utilized for the neighboring
minutiae in each sector instead of relative distances
or the directional difference between minutiae pairs.
Here, the measured ridge features are invariant to the
inter-ridge distances and locations of minutiae points.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed pre-alignment free can-
celable fingerprint template generation technique. The pro-
posed technique does not rely on detection of singular
points. We divide the input fingerprint image into a number
of sectors of equal angular width considering each minu-
tia as a reference and use the nearest neighbor minutiae
in each sector to compute transformation invariant ridge
count and mean ridge orientation features from each sector.
Cantor pairing function is applied to encode these fea-
tures uniquely. Further, the pointwise logarithm operation
is exploited to yield uniformly distributed features. Finally,
a random projection is adopted to derive a non-invertible
and revocable cancelable template. Experimental evaluation
performed over four datasets of FVC2002, FVC2004, and
FVC2006 databases depict that the significant performance
improvement is achieved as compared to the current state-
of-the-art techniques. Moreover, the security analysis of
our work confirms that our approach fulfills the desired
characteristics of template protection schemes preserving the
recognition performance too. However, the proposed ridge-
based feature computation for low-quality fingerprint and
partial fingerprint images is still a demanding area. In our
future work, we would try to address this limitation. The
computational complexity of the proposed method is O(n2).
Hence, future work along the direction to reduce/improve
computational complexity is underway.
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